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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

TANGREN FAMILY TRUST, by
RICHARD TANGREN, Trustee and
RICHARD TANGREN, Individually,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Court of Appeals No. 20050085-CA
Supreme Court No. 20070097-SC

v.
RODNEY TANGREN
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT ON GRANT OF CERTIORARI

JURISDICTION
UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-2-2(3)(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal

from the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, dated December 29,2006 (the "Opinion")
and designated as Tangren Family Trust, by Richard Tangren. Trustee and Richard Tangren,
Individually v. Rodney Tangren. 154 P.3d 180, 2006 UT App. 515. A copy of the Opinion
is attached hereto as Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1:

Did the Utah Court of Appeals erroneously apply the parol evidence rule?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In proceedings on petition for writ of certiorari,

Supreme Court affords no deference to conclusions of law reached by the court of appeals
or the district court. In proceedings on petition for writ of certiorari, Supreme Court reviews
the decision of the court of appeals for correctness." Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co..
2007 UT 28, f 11, - P.3d -. "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals,
not the trial court." Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n. 2006 UT 58,147
P.3dll89.
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
I.

U. S. CONST., AMEND. V, which reads as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

II.

U.S. CONST., AMEND. XIV § 1, which reads as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

III.

I § 7, which reads that, "[n]o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
UT. CONST., ART.
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IV.

I § 24, which states that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation."

U T . CONST., ART.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 29, 2002, Petitioner filed his Complaint against his son, Rodney Tangren
(herein after "Respondent") alleging that Respondent had violated terms of the lease
agreement dated February 24, 1994 (hereinafter, the "Lease"). R002-R019. On June 13,
2002, Respondent filed his Answer and Counterclaim to the Appellee's Complaint, alleging
that he had lawful possession of the property at issue as a lessee. R022-R028. Respondent
claimed that he had lawful possession of the property as a lessee and that Petitioner had
trespassed to real property. R025 at 1ff[5-l0.
On July 11,2002, Petitioner filed an Answer to the Appellant's Counterclaim. R029R030. On July 22,2002, upon completion of the parties' planning conference, the Rule 26(f)
Planning Conference Report and Stipulation was filed with the Seventh Judicial District
Court. It outlined discovery dates, how discovery should be conducted, and other important
factors under Rule 26(f). R031-R033. On July 29, 2002, Petitioner filed his initial
disclosures. R039-R041. On September 11, 2002, Respondent filed his initial disclosures.
R042-R043. The parties then proceeded to file interrogatories and answers in this matter.
R044-R047.
On November 8,2004, the Petitioner filed the Amended Complaint, clarifying that the
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Lease drafted in 1994 did not form a valid contract between the parties. The Amended
Complaint specifically indicated that the Lease was drafted to be used only where
Respondent's siblings took action against Respondent or the subject properties in an effort
to gain an interest therein. Furthermore, the Amended Complaint indicated that the property
was then valued at two million ($2,000,000.00) dollars. The Amended Complaint indicated
that, considering the value of the property, the rent payment set forth in the Lease of $150
per month was unconscionable, and therefore void. The Amended Complaint additionally
alleged that the parties had not ever treated the Lease as a valid lease agreement. R075 at
1f32(a>(d).
On November 15, 2004, Petitioner filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim in
which he added two affirmative defenses to his counterclaim. R092-R101. The Amended
Answer and Counterclaim added the fourth cause of action, which was Fraud, and a fifth
cause of action, which was Negligent Misrepresentation. R098-R099.
On August 25,2004, and November 17 and 18,2004, the allegations contained in the
Amended Complaint and the Amended Answer and Counterclaim came for trial before
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan
County, State of Utah. R127-R134. At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the trial
court found the Lease to be invalid and, thus, no award was granted to either the Petitioner
or Respondent at that time. Id. The parties were instructed to pay their own attorneys fees
and costs in this matter. Id. On January 12,2005, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact
-4-

and Order (the "Order"). R127-R134. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Addendum
"B" and incorporated herein by this reference.
On January 19,2005, Respondent filed his Notice ofAppeal from the Order. R138R139. On March 17,2006, Respondent filed his opening brief challenging (1) whether the
trial court erred "with regard to its statement of legal principles governing the construction
interpretation of lease agreements and associated issues raised by the Counterclaim in this
case;" (2) whether the trial court erred in concluding that the Lease Agreement was invalid,
based upon parol evidence testimony as to the intent of the parties that contradicted the
explicit terms of the written Lease Agreement;" and (3) whether the trial court failed "to
make adequate findings of fact upon which the Order of the trial court could be based." See,
Appellant's Brief'at pp. 1-2.
On December 29, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals entered the Opinion. See,
Addendum "A." The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the parties had entered into a
valid, integrated and unambiguous lease agreement, determining that the trial court's implicit
finding that the contract was not integrated was clearly erroneous based upon application of
the parol evidence rule. Id. The Utah Court of Appeals, in essence determined that the lack
of ambiguity in the remaining portions of the Lease weighed heavily in favor of finding that
the agreement of which it was a part is integrated. Id. Since the trial court had not addressed
the issue of whether a breach of the Lease had occurred, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed
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the decision based on the foregoing conclusions and remanded the case for further
proceedings respecting the issue of whether Respondent had breached the Lease. Id
On January 29, 2007, Petitioner filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari asking this
Court to grant certiorari on three (3) possible issues, to wit: (1) Did the Utah Court of
Appeals erroneously fail to require Appellant/Respondent to adhere to the marshaling
requirement, rendering a decision based upon the facts as presented by the
Appellant/Respondent rather than the facts as they were presented to the trial court in their
entirety? (2) Did the Utah Court of Appeals erroneously strictly apply the parol evidence rule
to a challenge to the integration of a contract in light of its recent determination that Utah no
longer strictly applies the parol evidence rule as determinative, but has determined that it is
simply part of the initial inquiry to determine whether an ambiguity exists in the contract's
language? (3) Did the Utah Court ofAppeals violate Appellee/Petitioner's due process rights
under U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V and XIV § 1 and UTAH CONST. ART. I §7 by depriving
Appellee/Petitioner his interest in the property at issue herein in spite of a mutually explicit
understanding between the parties that the Lease .would not be recorded unless
Appellant/Respondent's siblings attempted to infringe upon Appellant/Respondent's interest
in the property?
On April 27,2007, this Court issued its Order granting certiorari and briefing on the
issue of "whether the court of appeals erred in its assessment ofthe parol evidence rule." See,
Order dated April 27,2007.
-6-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early 1950s, with the encouragement and help from his brother, Petitioner
purchased some land known as the Anderson Bottom, together with some cattle, from Ralph
Miller. Petitioner purchased the cattle and his brother purchased the land, and together they
ran a cattle business for many years. Tr. Vol. I1 at p. 15. Some years later, the federal
government and the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") decided to make a national park
and Petitioner and his brother were forced from Anderson Bottom. Petitioner still had two
hundred and fifty (250) head of cattle, however, so it was imperative that he locate and
purchase other property. Petitioner relocated to land on the Colorado River (the "Colorado
River Land"), which he purchased from State Institutional Trust Lands ("SITLA") and the
BLM for the purpose of continuing his cattle business. The Colorado River Land is the land
now in dispute in the instant case. Tr. Vol. I, at p. 16.
Petitioner made numerous improvements to the Colorado River Land and spent a large
amount of money and time for said improvements. Respondent was employed by Petitioner
at their fencing company from 1972 to 1989. Petitioner assisted in the improvements on the
Colorado River Land; to wit: Respondent built two (2) building structures, one as an area
for hot tubs and the second encased a two thousand (2000) gallon propane tank. Petitioner

1

To avoid confusion, Petitioner refers throughout to the Transcripts in this matter as
"Vol. I" for the First Day and First Day - Continued; "Vol. II" as the Second Day of Trial and
Second Day - Continued; and "Vol. Ill" as the Third Day of Trial.
-7-

did not pay for these two structures built by the Respondent. Respondent was paid salary due
to his employment at their fencing company. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 194 and 196.
Petitioner testified that Respondent had done more work and shown more interest in
the ranch than his other children. Tr. Vol. II at pp. 112-113. In 1994, Respondent quit his
own fencing company to come work for Petitioner full time on the ranch. Respondent
became worried that the dude ranch would produce a large income and that his siblings
would then want an interest in it and would try and take itfromhim. Respondent spoke with
Petitioner about his concern and Petitioner told Respondent that he would take action to
ensure Petitioner's siblings could not take his interest in the dude ranchfromhim. Petitioner
then spoke to his attorneys in Las Vegas, Nevada, who instructed him that he had to sign a
lease to protect Respondent's interests. Petitioner was reluctant to do so, however, the
attorneys informed him that the Lease was the only way to legally protect Respondent's
interests. Petitioner instructed the attorneys to draft the Lease. Petitioner testified at the trial
in this matter that his understanding of the drafting of such a lease was for the purpose of
keeping the other children from being able to come in and take the ranch from the
Respondent. Tr. Vol. I at p. 51-55. Furthermore, he reiterated to Respondent what the
purpose of the Lease was, that it was a stop gap measure and not a lease that will prevent his
sibling from taking the ranch from him in the future. Tr. Vol. I at p. 104. Moreover,
Petitioner understood that it was only to be used in the event of his passing away. Tr. Vol.
I at pp. 105-106.
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Respondent also testified that the purpose of the Lease was to protect him from his
brothers and sisters and would come into effect only if something happened to Petitioner.
Tr. Vol. II at pp. 19-20. Respondent additionally testified that, as long as Petitioner was
living, Respondent did not anticipate his siblings attempting to take the ranch. Id.
The Lease was drafted and signed by both parties on or about February 24,1994. Tr.
Vol II at p 20. The parties stipulated to the Lease being signed in 1994. Petitioner testified
that he never gave a copy of the Lease to the Respondent and that he kept it with his
documents that he moved to a house that Respondent was living in when the fencing
company was sold. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 55, 57-58. Petitioner testified that he did not see the
Lease again until the year 2001. On July 19, 2001, after a falling out with Petitioner,
Respondent found and recorded the Lease with the San Juan County Recorder. R009.
Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with a copy of the recorded Lease. Tr. Vol. I at p.
68.
In March of 2002, Petitioner's counsel reviewed the documents and sent a notice to
Respondent at the address provided in the Lease, which was returned to counsel after three
(3) separate delivery attempts of March 23, March 28, and April 9, 2002. Tr. Vol. II at p.
165. On April 29, 2002, Petitioner filed the action in this matter. R002-R019. On August
25, 2004, and November 17 and 18, 2004, the allegations contained in the Amended
Complaint and the Amended Answer and Counterclaim came for trial before Honorable Lyle
R. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan County, State of Utah.
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R127-R134. At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the trial court found the Lease to
be invalid and, thus, no award was granted to either Respondent or Petitioner. Id. The trial
court found that it had received sufficient information to show that the Lease was never
intended to be a valid document unless Respondent was at risk of losing his interests in the
ranch to his siblings upon Petitioner's death. Id, see Tr. Vol. Ill at p. 3. On January 12,
2005, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Order,fromwhich Respondent timely
appealed to the Utah Court ofAppeals. A copy of the Findings of Fact and Order is attached
hereto as Addendum "B" and incorporated herein by this reference.
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Respondent challenged that the Lease was
a valid and binding lease, entitling him to enforcement. Respondent's first challenge was
based upon his contention that the Lease contained the essential elements of a contract, was
folly integrated and unambiguous, and was invalidated by the trial court contrary to Utah law.
Respondent also raised a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial
court's invalidation of the Lease and the improper denial of his counterclaim. Respondent
relied almost exclusively on the parol evidence rule in arguing the integration and ambiguity
of the Lease. See, Appellant's Brief dX pp. 26-36.
In Petitioner's Reply Briefof Appellee, Petitioner argued that Respondent had failed
to adequately marshal the evidence in his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and
that the trial court had correctly determined that the Lease was not a valid and binding
contract. See, Reply Briefof Appellee dXpp. 14-24. Petitioner relied upon the recent case of
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Gillmorv.Macev. 2005 UT App 351,121 P.3d 57 and its acknowledgment of this Court's
decision in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), both indicating
that Utah no longer strictly applied the parol evidence rule as determinative, but that it was
simply part of the initial inquiry to determine whether an ambiguity existed. Id. Petitioner
additionally pointed out that Respondent had failed to marshal all of the evidence in favor
of the trial court's findings, and set forth specific pertinent facts omitted by the Respondent,
such as his concession as to the purpose for entering into the Lease, or the integration
specifically at issue on appeal.
After briefing and arguments on the appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals entered the
Opinion on December 29,2006. See, Addendum "A." The Utah Court of Appeals undertook
an analysis of the matter under the parol evidence rule, in reliance upon Union Bank v.
Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985) and Hall v. Process Instruments & Control Inc., 890
P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995). It found that any relevant evidence, including parol evidence, is
admissible in the preliminary determination of integration; however, courts must "apply a
rebuttable presumption that a writing which on its face appears to be an integrated agreement
is what it appears to be." Addendum "A" at | 8 , citing Union Bank at 665. The Court of
Appeals determined that Petitioner had not overcome the presumption of integration, finding
that the Petitioner's testimony was the sole evidence on which the trial court could have
based its ruling that the Lease was invalid. Id. at ^[9. It specifically said, "[w]hile the trial
court could consider [Petitioner's] testimony regarding his intent in creating the Lease, the
court erred in relying on that testimony in the face of a clear and unambiguous integration
-11-

clause in the Lease itself." Id, see, Cantamar. 2006 UT App 321 at f 11. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the trial court'sfindingsas to integration were clearly erroneous and
that the Lease was an integrated agreement "against which parol evidence may not be
admitted absent some ambiguity in the terms of the Lease." Id.; see HalL 890 P.2d at 1027.
The Court of Appeals then undertook an analysis of the ambiguity of the terms of the
Lease, although it recognized that".. .neither party argu[ed] that the language of the Lease
create[d] any ambiguity. . ." Addendum "A" at ^[10. It recognized that the proffered
extrinsic evidence addressed only the Petitioner's subjective reasoning for entering into the
Lease, which did not uncover any ambiguity in the Lease itself. Id. at f 1L It determined
that, since there was no ambiguity in the remaining portions of the Lease, the trial court
improperly allowed Petitioner's testimony to modify the terms of the Lease, presumably
meaning the integration of the Lease. Id
The Court of Appeals then acknowledged the evidence presented as to the breach of
the contract, namely that Respondent had not made monthly payments to Petitioner for a
period of several years but had tendered larger payments by check later. It determined that
those payments by check were not addressed in the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals thus remanded the matter for further proceedings
on the alleged breach of contract after reversing the trial court's decision as to the integration
of the Lease.
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On January 29, 2007, Appellee filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari asking this
Court to grant certiorari on three (3) possible issues: (1) Did the Utah Court of Appeals
erroneously fail to require Appellant/Respondent to adhere to the marshaling requirement,
rendering a decision based upon the facts as presented by the Appellant/Respondent rather
than the facts as they were presented to the trial court in their entirety? (2) Did the Utah Court
of Appeals erroneously strictly apply the parol evidence rule to a challenge to the integration
of a contract in light of its recent determination that Utah no longer strictly applies the parol
evidence rule as determinative, but has determined that it is simply part of the initial inquiry
to determine whether an ambiguity exists in the contract's language? (3) Did the Utah Court
of Appeals violate Appellee/Petitioner's due process rights under U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V
and XIV § 1 and UTAH CONST. ART. I §7 by depriving Appellee/Petitioner his interest in the
property at issue herein in spite of a mutually explicit understanding between the parties that
the Lease would not be recorded unless Appellant/Respondent's siblings attempted to
infringe upon Appellant/Respondent's interest in the property?
On April 27,2007, this Court issued an Order granting certiorari and briefing on the
issue of "whether the court of appeals erred in its assessment of the parol evidence rule."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has long held that, "[e]vidence . . .attacking the existence of a written
contract,... is admissible as an exception to the general rule prohibiting consideration of
extrinsic evidence to alter or vary the terms of a written contract." Moody v. Smith, 9 Utah
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2d 139,141-142, 340 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah 1959). In Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, this Court
reiterated that evidence that attacks the very existence of the contract for the purpose of
proving it unenforceable does not contravene the parol evidence rule. Ibid., 656 P.2d 454,
455 (Utah 1982)(citations omitted). Additionally, this Court has determined that "[p]arol
evidence is admissible to show that written instruments were delivered to be effective only
on happening of contingency." Parker v. Weber Co. Irr. Dist. 251 P. 11 (Utah 1926). Our
United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals supports this concept by stating as follows:
A collateral parol agreement that a contract shall become effective only on
certain conditions or contingencies is not an oral contradiction or variation of
written instrument but goes to very existence of contract and tends to show that
no binding or effective contract ever existed, and therefore parol evidence is
admissible to show such condition precedent relating to taking effect o fwritten
instrument.
Henderson v. Pierson. 201 F.2d 740, 741 (CA.10.Okla. 1953). In Cimarron Ins. Co. v.
Pomeroy. the 10th Circuit also held that, "[p]arol evidence which does not impugn the
integrity of the writings to which it relates is admissible to show a condition precedent to the
taking effect of the engagements therein." Ibid, 234 F.2d 262, 263 (C.A.10 Okla. 1956).
".. .[0]ral testimony showing the terms and conditions under which a written contract shall
become effective is not integrated in the written contract if the writings of the parties are
silent with respect thereto and the oral proof is not inconsistent with such writings."
Dawault v. Baruch Oil Corp., 231 F.2d 413, 414 (C.A.10 Wy. 1956); see Annotation 70
A.L.R. 752; 20 AmJur. Evidence, §§ 1135,1136,1137,1138-1140. The United States 9th
Circuit Court ofAppeals may have articulated it best when it held that the parol evidence rule
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""presupposes an action based on a valid contract; and if the issue is as to the existence or
validity of the alleged contract, the rule, by its very terms, has no application." Baskin
Distribution, Inc. v. Pittwav Corp.. 141 F.3d 1173 (Table) (C.A.9 (Wash.), 1998).
The Court of Appeals inappropriately strictly applied the parol evidence rule to its
determination in the instant matter. The trial court bifurcated the integration clause from the
remainder of the contract in its determination as to the "ambiguity"of the Lease, but then
concluding that the lack of ambiguity in the remaining terms of the Lease not argued or
challenged by either party rendered the integration clause unambiguous and not subject to
parol evidence. The trial court correctly concluded, based on both parties testimonies, that
the Lease was not intended as a binding contract between Petitioner and Respondent, but
only for the purpose of protecting Respondent should something happen to Petitioner and
Respondent's siblings tried to take an interest in the property. As argued more particularly
below, the Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion should thus be overturned and the trial court's
Order affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY STRICTLY
APPLIED THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AS DETERMINATIVE.

Under 3 Corbin on Contracts, § 573, the parole evidence rule is analyzed and defined
as follows:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to
which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that
contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings
and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or
-15-

contradicting the writing. This is in substance what is called the 'parol
evidence rule/ a rule that scarcely deserves to be called a rule of evidence of
any kind, and a rule that is as truly applicable to written evidence as to parol
evidence. The use of such a name for this rule has had unfortunate
consequences, principally by distracting the attentionfromthe real issues that
are involved. These issues may be any one or more of the following: (1) Have
the parties made a contract? (2) Is that contract void or voidable because of
illegality,fraud,mistake, or any other reason? (3) Did the parties assent to a
particular writing as the complete and accurate 'integration' of that contract?'
(pp. 357-359.)
The United States 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the parol evidence rule, stating
that it "presupposes an action based on a valid contract; and if the issue is as to the existence
or validity of the alleged contract, the rule, by its very terms, has no application." Baskin
Distribution, Inc. v. Pittwav Corp.. 141 F.3d 1173 (Table) (C.A.9 (Wash.), 1998).
This Court takes a similar view of that of the 9th Circuit and has long held that,
"[e]vidence.. .attacking the existence of a written contract,... is admissible as an exception
to the general rule prohibiting consideration of extrinsic evidence to alter or vary the terms
of a written contract." Moodv v. Smith. 9 Utah 2d 139,141-142,340 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah
1959). In O'Harav.Hall. this Court stated that, "[i]t is the rule 'that where the existence of
a contract is the point in issue and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than one
inference, it is for the jury to determine whether the contract did in fact exist.9" Ibid, 628
P.2d 1289,1291 (Utah 1981), c/YmgPre-Fit Doors v. Dor-Wavs. 13 ArizApp. 438,477 P.2d
557 (1970); see also Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting. 451 Pa. 410, 305 A.2d 689
(1973); Havs v. Underwood. 196 Kan. 265, 411 P.2d 717 (1966); Ferreira v. Honolulu
Star-Bulletin. 44 Hawaii 567,356 P.2d 651 (1960); Megarrv Brothers v. United States 404
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F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1968). "Whether the parties intended to enter a binding contract is such
an issue of fact. . . . [t]here is no meeting of the minds where the parties do not intend to
contract and the question of intent generally is one to be determined by the trier of fact." Id.

Similarly in Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, this Court reiterated that evidence that attacks
the very existence of the contract for the purpose of proving it unenforceable does not
contravene the parol evidence rule. Ibid., 656 P.2d 454,455 (Utah 1982), citing Nielsen v.
Richter. 20 Cal.App.2d 546,67 P.2d 353 (1937); Berta v. Rocchio. 149 Colo. 325,369 P.2d
51 (1962); Lennen & Newell Inc. v. Clark Enterprises, Inc.. 51 Hawaii 233, 456 P.2d 231
(1969); Casentini v. Nevada National Bank. 88 Nev. 456,499 P.2d 652 (1972). Other state
and federal jurisdictions have also held that parol evidence is always competent to show the
existence of a contract. See, Dabbs v. Int'l Minerals & Chemical Corp., 339 F. Supp. 654,
6654 n.22 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Tepsich v. Howe Constr. Co.. 138 N.W.2d 376, 378 (Mich.
1965); Smith v.Worsham. 552 S.W.2d 367, 371 (Mo. App. 1977); Halldin v. Usher. 321
P.2d 746,748 (Cal. 1958); see also, Agristor Leasing v. Bertholf. 753 F. Supp. 881, 894-95
(D. Kan. 1990) ("parol evidence has been held admissible to show the nonexistence of a
binding contract"); Baskin Distrib. v. Pittwav Corp.. 141 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 1998) ("the
parol evidence rule does not apply when the parties are seeking to establish the validity or
invalidity of a contract"); Segaline v. Bank of Am.. N.A.. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8349,
2003 WL 21135553, fn. 1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2003)("the parol evidence rule does not
prevent the consideration of such evidence when the existence of the contract is at issue");
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Muhm v.Davis. 580 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st District])("Parol evidence is
always competent to show the nonexistence of a contract or the conditions upon which it may
become effective.").
As it pertains to Muhm's concept of "the conditions upon which it may become
effective," this Court has also addressed such a matter, stating that, "[p]arol evidence is
admissible to show that written instruments were delivered to be effective only on happening
of contingency." Parker v. Weber Co. Irr. Dist. 251 P. 11 (Utah 1926). Our United States
10th Circuit Court of Appeals supports this concept by stating as follows:
A collateral parol agreement that a contract shall become effective only on
certain conditions or contingencies is not an oral contradiction or variation of
written instrument but goes to very existence of contract and tends to show that
no binding or effective contract ever existed, and therefore parol evidence is
admissible to show such condition precedent relating to taking effect ofwritten
instrument.
Henderson v. Pierson. 201 F.2d740,741 (CA.10.Okla. 1953). The Court acknowledged in
Henderson that the trial court therein had found that the parties had agreed that ". . .the
written purchase order for equipment was not to be final and effective until Pierson and
Cease had received bidsfromthe other suppliers, and then only if Pierson and Cease sent a
check for $5,405.00 to cover the down payment to Henderson." Id. These criteria having
not occurred, and this finding having been supported by substantial evidence and not clearly
erroneous, was thus binding on the 10th Circuit in their determination. Id. The 10th Circuit
concluded that the contract in Henderson never became effective since the preconditions had
not been met. Id.
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Subsequent to Henderson, the 10th Circuit further addressed the issue as it pertained
to the integrity of the instrument. In Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Pomeroy, the 10th Circuit held that,
"[p]arol evidence which does not impugn the integrity of the writings to which it relates is
admissible to show a condition precedent to the taking effect of the engagements therein."
Ibid., 234 F.2d 262, 263 (C.A.IO Okla. 1956). That same year in a separate case, the 10th
Circuit expanded upon this concept, stating that, "oral testimony showing the terms and
conditions under which a written contract shall become effective is not integrated in the
written contract if the writings of the parties are silent with respect thereto and the oral proof
is not inconsistent with such writings." Dayvault v. Baruch Oil Corp., 231 F.2d 413, 414
(C.A.10 Wy. 1956); see Annotation 70 A.L.R. 752; 20 Am.Jur. Evidence, §§ 1135, 1136,
1137,1138-1140.
In Gillmor v. Macev. 2005 UT App 351, 121 P.3d 57, the Utah Court of Appeals
undertook an extensive analysis of the parol evidence rule, in reliance on this Court's
decision in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995), and
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym. 2003 UT 37 f7, 78 P.3d 600, providing as follows:
Under Utah law, if the initial review of the plain language of a contract, within
its four corners, reveals no patently obvious ambiguities, the inquiry into
whether an ambiguity exists in a contract does not always end there. Utah's
rules of contract interpretation allow courts to consider any relevant evidence
to determine whether a latent ambiguity exists in contract terms that otherwise
appear to be unambiguous. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n< 907
P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) ("When determining whether a contract is
ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered.") see also Nielsen v.
Gold's Gvm. 2003 UT 37 f7, 78 P.3d 600 (stating that any "[relevant,
extrinsic evidence 'of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered the
[contract]1 is admissible to assist the court in determining whether the contract
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is ambiguous") (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). [FN14] In
adopting this approach to the interpretation of contracts and contract
ambiguities, the Utah Supreme Court has reasoned that "[ojtherwise, the
determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely
on the 'extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and
experience.1"
Ward. 907 P.2d at 268.(citations omitted) Therefore, [although the terms of
an instrument may seem clear to a particular reader-including a judge-this
does not rule out the possibility that the parties chose the language of the
agreement to express a different meaning. A judge should therefore consider
any credible evidence offered to show the parties' intention. Id. See also
Nielsen, 2003 UT 37 at 17, 78 P.3d 600. Thus, a " '[Rational interpretation
requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to
prove the intention of the parties ... so that the court can "place itself in the
same situation in which the parties found themselves at the time of
contracting."'" Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (second alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
[FN14] In this regard, Utah case law has rejected the strict
application of the "four corners" rule, which limits the
boundaries of inquiry into whether an ambiguity exists in a
contract to the contract's "four corners"and effectively excludes
the evidence of any surrounding circumstances—outside of the
writing—that might indicate that the contract language lacks the
required degree of clarity. See, e.g. Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v.
Albertson's. Inc.. 2004 UT 10 \ 17, 104 P.3d 1226 (typifying
application of "four corners" rule of contract analysis when
written instrument is unambiguous and complete). See generally
2 E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, §§ 7.12-7.12a
(2d ed.2001) (explaining the four corners rule and the varying
degrees of stringency with which it is applied by state courts).
Likewise, Utah no longer strictly applies the "parol evidence
rule" or the "plain meaning rule," which exclude the use of any
parol evidence to show whether a contract's language lacks the
required degree of clarity. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers
Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995) ("While there is Utah case
law that espouses a stricter application of the [parol evidence]
rule and would restrict a determination of whether ambiguity
exists to a judge's determination of the meaning of the terms of
the writing itself, [see, e.g. Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel
Inc.. 2002 UT 62 fl6, 52 P.3d 1179 the better-reasoned
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approach is to consider the writing in light of the surrounding
circumstances."). See generally 2 Farnsworth § 7.12; 5 Margaret
N. Kniffin, Corbin on Contracts § 24.7 (rev. ed.1998)
(discussing the various views courts have on how the parol
evidence and plain meaning rules should be applied in contract
interpretation). Instead, Utah law has made these rules of
interpretation just part of the initial inquiry to determine whether
an ambiguity exists in contract language. They are no longer the
determinative rules they once were when parties asserted that a
contract contained ambiguities. See See Ward v. Intermountain
Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995); Nielsen v.
Gold's Gvm. 2003 UT 37, f7, 78 P.3d 600.
Ibid. at1f35.
Petitioner testified at the trial in this matter that his understanding of the drafting of
the Lease was for the purpose of keeping the other childrenfrombeing able to come in and
take the ranch from the Respondent. Tr. Vol. I at p. 51-55. Furthermore, he testified that he
reiterated to Respondent what the purpose of the Lease was, that it was not a lease, but a stop

Up

gap measure that will prevent his sibling from taking the ranch from him in the future. Tr.
Vol. I at p. 104. Moreover, Petitioner understood that it was only to be used in the event of
his passing away. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 105-106.
Respondent also testified that the purpose of the Lease was to protect him from his
brothers and sisters and would come into effect only if something happened to Petitioner.

' yi

JAJQ

Tr. Vol. II at pp. 19-20. Respondent additionally testified that, as long as Petitioner was I
living, Respondent did not anticipate his siblings attempting to take the ranch. Id.
On January 12, 2005, the trial court entered its Order, which sets forth, in pertinent
part, as follows:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
9.

10.

11.
12.

13.
14.

15.

The Court finds that the lease was prepared at the behest of Richard
Tangren, that he had advice of counsel with regard to its terms and
went against the advice of counsel. The Court finds that his actions
against the counsel of his attorneys in the execution and content of the
lease is an indication of his effort to make a concession to Rodney
Tangren and that the agreement would not come into effect unless there
was a quarrel or dispute with the Tangren siblings.
The Court finds that based upon the foregoing, the document noted in
this litigation as the "Lease" was intended as a protection against an
incursion upon the Defendant by his siblings and was not intended to
govern actions as between Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren and
both parties agreed and understood that it would only take effect if
challenged by Rodney's siblings.
The Court finds that the "Lease" is not a valid document.
The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew the "Lease" was not
intended as a functioning agreement between the Tangren trust and
Defendant and was intended to protect Rodney from incursions or
challenges by his siblings.
The Court finds that there was no reliance on the lease document as a
valid and binding lease by Rodney Tangren.
As the Court has found the lease to be invalid, there was no
requirement to pay rent and thereby no rent is due from Rodney
Tangren to Richard Tangren.
The Courtfindsthat Rodney Tangren knew that the agreement was not
between he and Richard, but was to protect himfromhis siblings and
therefore, there was nofraudwith induced him or caused any damage
to Rodney.

In short, the trial court determined that the Lease was not a valid and binding contract
between the parties, basing its determination on the evidence conceded to by both parties that
the Lease was only to be a protection for Rodney against his siblings, in the event of
Richard's death. Based on its invalidation of the Lease, the trial court refused to grant
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Richard any monetary relief for rent thereunder requested in his counterclaim. Respondent
appealed from the Order.
On March 17, 2006, Respondent filed their opening brief with the Utah Court of
Appeals challenging (1) whether the trial court erred "with regard to its statement of legal
principles governing the construction interpretation of lease agreements and associated issues
raised by the Counterclaim in this case;" (2) whether the trail court erred in concluding that
the Lease Agreement was invalid, based upon parol evidence testimony as to the intent of the
parties that contradicted the explicit terms of the written Lease Agreement;" and (3) whether
the trial court failed "to make adequate findings of fact upon which the Order of the trial
court could be based." See, Appellant ys Brief at pp. 1 -2. Respondent raised the issue of parol
evidence with respect to an ambiguity in the Lease in the Appellant ys Brief, arguing that the
trial court made no findings with respect to the presumption of integration. Id. at pp. 28-29.
On May 25,2007, Petitioner filed the Reply Brief of Appellee challenging that the trial
court correctly determined that the Lease was not a binding and valid contract, and that such
a determination was supported by the evidence presented. Petitioner argued that the parol
evidence rule was no longer strictly applied in Utah, relying on Gillmor, and that it was
simply part of the initial inquiry, arguing that any relevant evidence was admissible in
determining the integration of the Lease. Reply Brief of Appellee at pp. 27-28.
On December 29, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals entered the Opinion in favor of
Respondent. See, Addendum "A." The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the parties had
entered into a valid, integrated and unambiguous lease agreement, determining that the trial
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court's implicit finding that the contract was not integrated was clearly erroneous based upon
application ofthe parol evidence rule. Id. The Utah Court of Appeals, in essence determined
that the lack of ambiguity in the remaining portions of the Lease weighed heavily in favor
of finding that the agreement of which it was a part is integrated. Id. Since the trial court
had not addressed the issue of whether a breach of the Lease had occurred, the Utah Court
of Appeals reversed the decision based on the foregoing conclusions and remanded the case
for further proceedings respecting the issue of whether Respondent had breached the Lease.
Id.
I The Utah Court of Appeals strictly app lied the parol evidence rule, determining that the trial
court could not rely on extrinsic evidence in the "face of clear and unambiguous integration
clause in the Lease itself." Addendum "A" at f9.

i
The parol evidence rule, no longer strictly applied, requires a two-step undertaking
to determine integration and then ambiguity in the remaining terms of the Lease. As to the
integration ofthe Lease, however, the trial court is allowed to consider any relevant evidence
in its determination, charging that a presumption exists that must be overcome that the
writing is what it appears to be. As recognized by Gillmor. however, ". . .a rational
interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered
to prove the intention of the parties...so that the court can 'place itself in the same situation
in which the parties found themselves at the time of contracting." Ibid, at %35.
The concepts contained in Gillmor support the standing precedentfromthis Court and
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals which allows for admission of parol evidence with respect
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to the question of whether a contract exists. £ge,Xloody, MFT Leasing, Parker, Henderson, J[( o /^j
Cimarron, Dayvault. The evidence presented m this matter by both parties'testimonies was -jf* 0
that the contract was only intended to be a ^op-gap measure to protect Respondent from his
siblings in the event of Petitioner's death. The trial court correctly allowed for the admission
of evidence pertaining to the collateral parol agreement in making its determination that the
Lease was not a valid document between the parties.
Similar to Henderson, supra, a collateral parol agreement was created by the parties
that the Lease herein would only become effective on certain conditions or contingencies.
Such agreement was not an oral contradiction or variation on the written instrument, but went
to the very existence of the contract, evidencing that no binding and effective contract ever
existed. In Henderson, the agreement was not binding until bids and a down payment had
been received. In the instant matter, the Lease was not to be valid unless Petitioner passed
away. Additionally, the 10th Circuit acknowledged that the trial court's findings were
supported by evidence and not clearly erroneous, so those findings were binding upon the
10th Circuit in its determination. Both parties in this matter submitted the evidence through
their testimonies as to the collateral parol agreement, sufficiently supporting the trial court's
findings that the Lease was not intended to be a valid and binding contract either between
the parties and not until Petitioner passed away and Respondent's siblings attempted to take
Respondent's interests in the property at issue.
Similar to Cimarron, supra, the collateral parol agreement created between the parties
herein does not impugn the integrity of the writings to which they relate and are thus
-25-
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admissible to show "a condition precedent to the taking effect of the engagements therein/9
Ibid, 234 F.2d 262, 263 (C.A.10 Okla. 1956). The actual terms of the Lease were not at
issue herein. The parties intended them, as they were in writing, to govern the property
interests contained therein, conditioned upon the death of Petitioner and the challenge to the
Respondent's interest therein by the siblings. Absent these conditions, Petitioner never
intended for Respondent to take possession of the property. Petitioner was not leasing the
property to Respondent during the time he was alive.
The 10th Circuit has also addressed the issue of integration, which appears to be the
crux of the Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion in this matter. The 10th Circuit stated that, "oral
testimony showing the terms and conditions under which a written contract shall become
effective is not integrated in the written contract if the writings of the parties are silent with
respect thereto and the oral proof is not inconsistent with such writings." Dayvault v. Baruch
Oil Corp.. 231 F.2d 413,414 (C.A. 10 Wy. 1956); see Annotation 70 A.L.R. 752; 20 Am.Jur.
Evidence, §§ 1135,1136, 1137, 1138-1140. In the instant matter, the Lease itself does not
mention anything with respect to the timeframeor conditions under which it was to become
effective, hence such evidence was offered by testimony of both parties at the trial in this
matter. Such testimony did not contravene the terms of the written Lease itself and, in fact,
the parties agree that the terms were their intent with certain conditions and contingencies
as to it becoming effective, namely, that Petitioner would pass away or the siblings would
attempt to take Respondent's interest in the property. Thus, this evidence was not integrated
into the written Lease and is admissible as parol evidence to show the existence of a valid
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or binding contract, so long as it remains consistent with the terms of the Lease, as argued
supra.
The Utah Court of Appeals erroneously determined the matter based strictly on the
parol evidence rule as determinative, by stating that the clause is clear and unambiguous
despite the concession by both parties sworn testimony that the Lease was not intended to be
recorded and enforced unless certain factors occurred. This evidence was clearly both
"relevant" and "credible" and thus, properly admitted by the trial court in its determination
as to integration. See, Gillmor. The fact that both parties agreed to it clearly overcomes the
presumption.
The trial court amply applied the parol evidence rule as it should be, as an initial
inquiry rather than determinative; however, the Utah Court of Appeals strictly applied the
parol evidence rule and erroneously determined that the trial court somehow used this
evidence to amended the language of the Lease. As argued supra, the terms of the Lease
were not altered by the evidence that it was not intended to be valid absent the death of
Petitioner or a challenge to Respondent's interests by his siblings.
The Court of Appeals failed to recognize the trial court's Order as being one of a
determination as to whether a contract existed between the parties rather than whether the
terms of such a contract were ambiguous. The United States 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
stated it best when it determined that the parol evidence rule "presupposes an action based
on a valid contract; and if the issue is as to the existence or validity of the alleged contract,
the rule, by its very terms, has no application." Baskin Distribution, Inc. v. Pittway Corp.,
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141 F.3d 1173 (Table) (C.A.9 (Wash.), 1998). The trial court correctly concluded, based on
both parties testimonies, that the Lease was not intended as a binding contract between
Petitioner and Respondent, but only for the purpose of protecting Respondent should
something happen to Petitioner and Respondent's siblings tried to take an interest in the
property. Since neither of the conditions were met, Respondent's recording of the Lease did
not automatically validate it as a binding agreement between the parties. According to this
Court and various other state and federal jurisdictions cited supra, not only was the trial court
correct in admitting such evidence, it was required to do so in order to determine the
threshold issue of whether a valid contract even existed, particularly given the silence of the
Lease itself with respect to such a matter.
The Utah Court of Appeals' application of the parol evidence rule to this matter was
thus misplaced. The matter at issue herein pertained to a collateral parol agreement,
necessary to the determination of whether a valid contract existed. The parol evidence rule
has no application until the court determines that a valid contract exists, hence the evidence
admitted and appropriately relied upon by the trial court in this matter as to the existence of
the contract was admissible and the trial court's Order should be affirmed.

[remainder of page left intentionally blank]
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests that this
Court enter an order overturning the Opinion rendered in this matter by the Utah Court of
Appeals, dated December 29,2006, and affirm the trial court's Order.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of June, 2007.

Craig C
Attorney for Petitioner
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TANGREN FAMILY TRUST, by Richard
TANGREN, Trustee, and Richard Tangren,
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Rodney TANGREN, Defendant and Appellant
No. 20050085-CA.
Dec. 29,2006.
Background: Landlord sued tenant alleging breach
of lease and seeking damages and eviction. After
bench trial, the Seventh District Court, Monticello
Department, Lyle R. Anderson, J., ruled that the
lease was not intended to govern the relationship
between the landlord and the tenant, invalidated the
lease, and ordered tenant off the property. Tenant
appealed.

30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(8) k. Review Where
Evidence Consists of Documents. Most Cited Cases
Evidence 157 €=>397(2)
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
157k397 Contracts in General
157k397(2) k. Completeness of
Writing and Presumption in Relation Thereto;
Integration. Most Cited Cases
A trial court's determination as to whether a
contract is integrated is a question of fact subject to
the clearly erroneous standard of review.
A trial court's determination as to whether a
contract is integrated is a question of fact subject to
the clearly erroneous standard of review.
[2J Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(8)

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J., held
that:
(1) lease was fully-integrated contract against which
parol evidence was not admissible, and
(2) lease was not ambiguous.

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(8) k. Review Where
Evidence Consists of Documents. Most Cited Cases

Reversed and remanded.
Contracts 95 €=>176(2)
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(8)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review

95 Contracts
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(A) General Rules of Construction
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95kl76 Questions for Jury
95kl76(2) k. Ambiguity in General.
Most Cited Cases
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of
law (hat is reviewed for correctness.

may be admitted only if the court makes a
subsequent determination that the language of the
agreement is ambiguous.

Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of
law that is reviewed for correctness.

157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
157k397 Contracts in General
157k397(2) k. Completeness of
Writing and Presumption in Relation Thereto;
Integration. Most Cited Cases

[3] Evidence 157 €=>397(1)
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
157k397 Contracts in General
157k397(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
In the absence of fraud, the parol evidence rule
excludes
contemporaneous
conversations,
statements, or representations, offered for the
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract.
[41 Evidence 157 €=»397(1)
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
157k397 Contracts in General
157k397(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Evidence 157 C=>448
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(D) Construction or Application of
Language of Written Instrument
157k448 k. Grounds for Admission of
Extrinsic Evidence. Most Cited Cases
The application of the parol evidence rule involves
two steps: (1) the court must consider whether the
agreement is integrated, and (2) if the court finds
that the agreement is integrated, then parol evidence

[5] Evidence 157 €=>397(2)

Evidence 157 €==>448
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(D) Construction or Application of
Language of Written Instrument
157k448 k. Grounds for Admission of
Extrinsic Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Any relevant evidence, including parol evidence, is
admissible in the preliminary determination of
integration of a contract; courts must, however,
apply a rebuttable presumption that a writing which
on its face appears to be an integrated agreement is
what it appears to be.
[6] Evidence 157 €=>393(1)
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
157k393 Leases
157k393(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Lease of land was a Mly-integrated contract against
which parol evidence was not admissible at trial on
landlord's breach of contract and eviction claim,
even though landlord testified that the purpose of
the lease was simply to protect the tenant from the
interests of his siblings in the property after the
landlord's death; integration clause clearly stated
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that the lease was the entire agreement governing
the relationship between landlord and tenant and
concerning the land.
[7] Evidence 157 €=»448
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(D) Construction or Application of
Language of Written Instrument
157k448 k. Grounds for Admission of
Extrinsic Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Lease of land was not ambiguous, as required for
admission of parol evidence in determining validity
of lease, even though landlord testified that lease
was intended only to protect tenant from interests of
his siblings in the property after death of landlord,
given that landlord's parol evidence only explained
landlord's subjective reasons for entering the lease,
and parol evidence did not uncover any ambiguity
in the lease.
Seventh
District,
Monticello
Department,
020700046; The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson.
Matthew P. Jube, Provo, for Appellant.
Craig C. Halls, Blanding, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, BILLINGS, and DAVIS.
OPINION (For Official Publication)
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
*1 1 1 Rodney Tangren (Defendant) appeals the
decision of the trial court invalidating a lease
agreement between Defendant and his father
Richard Tangren (Plaintiff). We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND
1 2 This dispute arose out of the joint efforts of
Plaintiff and Defendant to develop 135 acres of
unimproved land (the Land) near the Colorado
River into a dude ranch. In 1981, Plaintiff
purchased the Land from the State Institutional
Trust Lands and the Bureau of Land Management.
The Land has since been held in trust by the
© 2007 Thomson/West. No
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Tangren Family Trust, of which Plaintiff is the
trustee and Defendant is a beneficiary.
t 3 In the years following his purchase of the
Land, Plaintiff commenced work on the dude ranch.
He built a two-story structure with a basement and
blasted areas out of the side of the mountain,
complete with connecting tunnels, to be used as
storage areas and potential guest quarters. Plaintiff
also created recreational amenities on the Land,
including a baseball diamond, a shooting range, an
airplane runway, and horse corrals. Plaintiff enlisted
Defendant to help in developing the Land into a
commercially viable dude ranch, keeping Defendant
on the payroll of Plaintiffs fencing company while
Defendant worked on the Land.
f 4 Defendant eventually became concerned that
his investment of capital and time could be lost
once the dude ranch became profitable. He worried
that his siblings, also beneficiaries of the Tangren
Family Trust, would attempt to take away his stake
in the project. In 1992, responding to Defendants
concerns, Plaintiff prepared, and both parties
entered into, a lease agreement (the Lease). Under
the terms of the Lease, Plaintiff leased the Land to
Defendant for a period of ninety-nine years. The
Lease was re-executed in 1994 with the only
difference being the deletion of Defendant's wife as
a named lessee. The Lease required Defendant to
pay Plaintiff $275 per month, which covered rent,
taxes, and insurance. Both the 1992 lease and the
1994 lease included the same integration clause,
stating that the Lease contained "the entire
understanding between the parties with respect to its
subject-matter, the [Land] and all aspects of the
relationship between Lessee and Lessor."
Defendant recorded the Lease in 2001, after
Defendant's relationship with Plaintiff deteriorated.
In 2002, after sending multiple notices of default,
Plaintiff filed a complaint in district court seeking
to evict Defendant from the Land and to recover
damages under the terms of the Lease. Defendant
claimed that he was not in default because he paid
the rent in cash and even tendered checks to cover
any unpaid balance.
t 5 At trial, the court considered extrinsic evidence
concerning the intent of the parties in creating the
a to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Lease. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant was in
default or, in the alternative, that the Lease was
created only to protect Defendant's interest from the
other Tangren Family Trust beneficiaries should
Plaintiff pass away. Further, Plaintiff testified that
the Lease was not to be recorded prior to Plaintiffs
death. Defendant claimed that the parties intended
the Lease to be an enforceable contract and that he
had not breached it. Following a three-day bench
trial, the court issued an order invalidating the
Lease. The trial court found that the Lease was
created only to prevent Defendant's siblings from
encroaching on Defendant's investment and that the
Lease was not meant to govern the relationship
between Plaintiff and Defendant. The trial court
therefore ordered Defendant off the Land and
provided for the timely removal of Defendant's
personal property. Defendant now appeals.
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Swenson, 707 P.2d 663,665 (Utah 1985).
The application of the parol evidence rule involves
two steps. First, the court must consider whether the
agreement is integrated. If the court finds [that] the
agreement is integrated, then parol evidence may be
admitted only if the court makes a subsequent
determination that the language of the agreement is
ambiguous.
Hall v. Process Instruments & Control Inc., 890
P.2d 1024, 1027 (Utah 1995). Any relevant
evidence, including parol evidence, is admissible in
the preliminary determination of integration. Courts
must, however, "apply a rebuttable presumption that
a writing which on its face appears to be an
integrated agreement is what it appears to be."
Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665.
I. Integration

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
*2 [1][2] f 6 The parties have raised multiple
issues that stem from the trial court's interpretation
of the Lease. A trial court's determination as to
whether a contract is integrated is a question of fact.
See Cantamar, LLC. v. Champagne, 2006 UT App
321,1 11, 142 P.3d 140; Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp.,
638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981). Whether a
contract is ambiguous is a question of law. See
WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp.,
2002 UT 88,f 22, 54 P.3d 1139; Winegar v.
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). We
review questions of feet under the clearly erroneous
standard and questions of law for correctness. See
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-36 (Utah 1994).
ANALYSIS
[3][4][5] % 1 Defendant claims that the Lease is a
valid, enforceable agreement that governs the
parties' interests in the Land, and that the court
impermissibly considered parol evidence in
invalidating the Lease. In the absence of fraud, the
parol evidence rule excludes "contemporaneous
conversations, statements, or representations,
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the
terms of an integrated contract." Union Bank v.
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

f 8 Defendant claims that the trial court erred in
using extrinsic evidence to invalidate the Lease.™1
Though the question of integration is a question of
fact for which the trial court may consider any
relevant evidence, see id, the party challenging the
application of the parol evidence rule must
overcome the presumption that a "writing which on
its face appears to be an integrated agreement is
what it appears to be." Id. The agreement in the
instant case includes an integration clause titled "
Entire Agreement," which states that the Lease
contains the entire understanding between the
parties with respect to the Land and to the
lessor-lessee relationship. The supreme court has
recently reiterated the importance and purpose of
integration clauses in contracts:
[Integration] clauses are routinely incorporated in
agreements in order to signal to the courts that the
parties agree that the contract is to be considered
completely integrated.... [T]he purpose and effect of
including [an integration] clause is to preclude the
subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary
negotiations or of side agreements in a proceeding
in which a court interprets the document.
*3 Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc.,
2004 UT 70,1 28, 98 P.3d 15 (quotations and
citation omitted). Here, the record reflects that
to Qrig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Plaintiff worked closely with his attorneys during
the drafting of the Lease. Plaintiff testified that he
went against his attorneys' advice in altering some
of the terms of the Lease after it was drafted and
prior to having Defendant sign, including the
unusually long term of the Lease and the low
monthly rental payment schedule. In both the 1992
lease and the 1994 lease, Plaintiff included the same
integration clause.
[6] 1 9 At trial, Plaintiff testified that he intended
the Lease to become effective only to protect
Defendant from his siblings in the event of
Plaintiffs death. This testimony is the sole evidence
on which the trial court could have based its ruling
that the Lease was invalid. Utah law has a stated
preference for gleaning the intent of contracting
parties, "whenever possible, from written
documents rather than from self-serving testimony."
Glauser Storage, LLC. v. Smedley, 2001 UT App
141,1 20, 27 P.3d 565; see also Lee v. Barnes,
1999 UT App 126,f 9, 977 P.2d 550. Plaintiff has
not overcome the presumption of integration. See
Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665. The lease in question
contains a clear and unambiguous integration
clause, the purpose of which is to "preclude the
subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary
negotiations or of side agreements." Ford, 2004 UT
70 at 1 28, 98 P.3d 15 (quotations and citation
omitted). While the trial court could consider
Plaintiffs testimony regarding his intent in creating
the Lease, the court erred in relying on that
testimony in the face of a clear and unambiguous
integration clause in the Lease itself. See Cantamar,
2006 UT App 321 at 1 11, 142 P.3d 140. We
therefore hold that the trial court's findings as to
integration were clearly erroneous. The Lease is an
integrated agreement, against which parol evidence
may not be admitted absent some ambiguity in the
teims of the Lease. See Hall, 890 P.2d at 1027.

II. Ambiguity
1 10 Because we hold that the Lease is an
integrated agreement, we now consider whether the
Lease contains any ambiguities that would justify
the trial court's decision to consider the parol
evidence offered by the parties. Despite neither
© 2007 Thomson/West. No
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party arguing that the language of the Lease creates
any ambiguity, we discuss ambiguity in order to
complete the two-step analysis discussed in Hall: "
If the court finds [that] the agreement is integrated,
then parol evidence may be admitted only if the
court makes a subsequent determination that the
language of the agreement is ambiguous." Id. As
with the initial inquiry into the question of
integration, some cases have permitted the
consideration of any relevant evidence in
determining whether a contract is ambiguous. See
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d
264, 268 (Utah 1995); Cantamar, 2006 UT App
321 at 1 26, 142 P.3d 140; Gillmor v. Macey, 2005
UT App 351,1 35, 121 P.3d 57 (rejecting "the
strict application of the 'four comers' rule, which
limits the boundaries of inquiry into whether an
ambiguity exists in a contract to the contract's 'four
corners' "). If the court then concludes, in light of
all the credible relevant evidence, that the contract
language is indeed ambiguous, parties may be
allowed to introduce extrinsic evidence to resolve
any ambiguities. See Cantamar, 2006 UT App 321
at 1 27, 142 P.3d 140. "Conversely, if after
considering such evidence, the court determines that
the language of the contract is not ambiguous, then
the parties' intentions must be determined solely
from the language of the contract." Id. (quotations
and citation omitted).
*4 [7] 1 11 We distinguish the instant case from
the Ward line of cases above. The proffered
extrinsic evidence in those cases helped uncover
ambiguities in the text of the agreements that may
not have been obvious on their face. In our case, the
proffered extrinsic evidence addresses only
Plaintiffs subjective reasons for entering into the
Lease and does not help uncover any ambiguity in
the Lease itself. The language of the Lease is clear
and not "capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of uncertain terms, missing
terms, or other facial deficiencies." Winegar v.
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)
(quotations and citation omitted). Because the
Lease is unambiguous, the trial court improperly
allowed Plaintiffs testimony to modify the terms of
the Lease.
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III. Breach
% 12 At trial, the court admitted testimony and
evidence concerning Defendant's possible breach of
the Lease, specifically Defendant's duty to pay
monthly rent to Plaintiff. The trial court expressly
found that Defendant did not make the monthly
cash payments he claimed to have made to Plaintiff
during a period of several years. But the trial court
has not made findings of fact and conclusions of
law concerning the larger payments allegedly made
by check. We therefore remand the case for further
proceedings, consistent with this opinion, to
determine whether Defendant in feet breached the
unambiguous terms of the Lease.

Tangren Family Trust ex rel. Tangren v. Tangren
... p.3d ----, 2006 WL 3842111 (Utah App.), 2006
UT App 515
END OF DOCUMENT

CONCLUSION
t 13 Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a valid,
integrated, and unambiguous lease agreement.
Though the trial court could consider extrinsic
evidence to determine whether the Lease was in fact
integrated, the trial court's implicit finding that the
contract was not integrated was clearly erroneous.
The presumption favoring a finding of integration
is, in this case, strengthened by the presence of a
clear and unambiguous integration clause in the
Lease from which the trial court should have
gleaned the parties' intent. Such an integration
clause weighs heavily in favor of a finding that the
agreement of which it is a part is integrated. Finally,
the trial court did not make a sufficient
determination of breach.
f 14 We therefore reverse and remand the case for
further proceedings concerning Defendant's alleged
breach of the Lease.
1 15 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS,
Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.
FN1. The trial court's invalidation of the
Lease based on extrinsic evidence includes
the implicit determination that the
agreement was not integrated and therefore
was subject to modification via extrinsic
evidence.
UtahApp.,2006.
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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CU3RK OF THE COURT

BY.
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE TANGREN FAMILY TRUST,
by RICHARD TANGREN, TRUSTEE and
RICHARD TANGREN, individually.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil No. 0207-46

RODNEY TANGREN,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER came before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson on
the 25th day of August, 2004.

Plaintiff Richard Tangren,

individually and as trustee, was present and represented by Craig
C. Halls; Defendant Rodney Tangren was present and represented by
Matthew Jube.

This trial was suspended at the close of the first

day of testimony and the parties returned on the 17th day of
November, 2004, and the balance of the testimony was received by
the court; both parties were present and represented by counsel
as above stated.

The Court having received all of the evidence

1

and having observed all of the witnesses, taken their testimony
and reviewed the exhibits, now makes the following
FINDINGS OP PACT
1*

The center of the dispute was a Lease dated in 1992 and

apparently signed by Richard Tangren, Paula Tangren and Rodney
Tangren.
2.

There was evidence that Paula Tangren's name had been

removed from the lease and from the notary certificate and the
lease had been resigned and notarized in 1994, with the
signatures of Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren.
3.

The deletion of Mrs. Tangren#s name in 1994 was

apparently done without objection of the Defendant.
4.

The Lease was recorded in 2001 after a falling out

between Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren.
5.

From 1992 until the lease was filed in 2001, Richard

Tangren had been able to come and go from the subject property as
he pleased.
6.

There was disputed testimony as to whether or not the

lease was delivered when signed in 1992 or 1994, or whether it
was delivered prior to being recorded in 2001.
7.

The court believes that where testimony was

contradictory, the testimony of Richard Tangren was more

2

U

transparent and, therefore, the Court believed it to be more
truthful.
8.

The Court finds that the Defendant, and more

particularly his wife, was more meticulous in the records she
kept with regard to expenses or expenditures on the ranch
property, yet made no record of payments on the lease.
Therefore, the Court finds that there were no cash payments made
for the period of 1992 through the present.
9.

The Court finds that the lease was prepared at the

behest of Richard Tangren, that he had advice of counsel with
regard to its terms and went against the advice of counsel. The
Court finds that his actions against the counsel of his attorneys
in the execution and content of the lease is an indication of his
effort to make a concession to Rodney Tangren and that the
agreement would not come into effect unless there was a quarrel
or dispute with the Tangren siblings.
10.

The Court finds that based upon the foregoing, the

document noted in this litigation as the "Lease" was intended as
a protection against an incursion upon the Defendant by his
siblings and was not intended to govern actions as between
Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren and both parties agreed and

3

understood that it would only take effect if challenged by
Rodney's siblings.
11.

The Court finds that the "Lease" is not a valid

document.
12.

The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew the "Lease"

was not intended as a functioning agreement between the Tangren
Trust and Defendant and was intended to protect Rodney from
incursions or challenges by his siblings.
13.

The Court finds that there was no reliance on the lease

document as a valid and binding lease by Rodney Tangren.
14.

As the Court has found the lease to be invalid, there

was no requirement to pay rent and thereby no rent is due from
Rodney Tangren to Richard Tangren.
15.

The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew that the

agreement was not between he and Richard, but was to protect him
from his siblings and therefore, there was no fraud which induced
him or caused any damage to Rodney.
16. With regard to the Defendant's unjust enrichment claim,
the Court does not find sufficient evidence to show that he
improved the property.

The value or evidence on expenditures was

just to maintain the property and did not increase the value of
the property.

4

17.

The Court finds that there was no damage upon Rodney's

removal of the blinds from -the property because there was no
evidence that the value of the property was diminished and the
carpet may have been replaced in any event.
18. The Court finds that there was insufficient evidence to
determine damages under the Defendant's Counterclaims.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The claim of Richard Tangren for rents is denied and no
sum is awarded therefor.
2.

The counterclaim of Rodney Tangren for unjust enrichment

is denied and no sum is awarded therefor.
3*

The claim of Rodney Tangren for specific performance is

denied and no sum is awarded therefor.
4*

The claim of Rodney Tangren for reliance damages is

denied and no sum is awarded therefor.
5«

The claim of Rodney Tangren for fraud is denied and no

sum is awarded therefor.
6.

The Defendant may remove his personal property from the

premises and shall have six months, until May 18, 2005, to remove
said property or the same shall be forever forfeited.
7«

Any items which have become fixtures to the property

shall remain on the property.

5

8.

Each of the parties shall pay their own costs and

attorney fees incurred in pursuance of this action.
DATED this

fflU

day of J ^ W ^ v f r

2005.

BY THE COURT:

/IS /

ICT JUDGE
ITJUDGE
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Approved as to form
and content:
MATTHEW JUBE

Attorney for Defendant
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Baskin Distribution, Inc. v. Pittway Corp.
C.A.9 (Wash.), 1998.
NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION.(The Court's decision is referenced in a "
Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions"
appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FICTA9
Rule 36-3 for rules regarding the citation of
unpublished opinions.)
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
BASKIN DISTRIBUTION, INC,
Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant,
v.
PITTWAY CORPORATION, a Delaware
Corporation, successor in interest to Apex Security
Alarm Products, Inc., Defendant
-Counter-Claimant-Appellee.
No. 96-35882.
D.C. No. CV-95-01033-BJR.
Decided March 9, 1998.
Argued and Submitted December 4,1997 Seattle
Washington.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Barbara J.
Rothstein, Chief Judge, Presiding.
Before
REAVLEY,FN**GOODWIN
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

and

FN** Honorable Thomas M. Reavley,
Senior United States Circuit Judge for the
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUMS
FN* This disposition is not appropriate for
publication and may not be cited to or by
the courts of this circuit except as provided

*1 Baskin Distribution, Inc. ("BDI"), a Washington
based distributor of residential and commercial
security systems, appeals the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Pittway Corporation,
purchaser of the assets of Apex Security Company (
"Apex"). BDI filed suit alleging that Apex
breached a contract granting BDI exclusive
distribution of security systems for Apex. Finding
that no contract was ever formed, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
Apex, located in North Carolina, manufactured
home security devices that it distributed via
exclusive distributors. In late 1994 continuing
through mid-1995, Christopher Baskin, President of
BDI and David Hanchette, Apex Director of Sales
and Marketing, negotiated for BDI to become an
Apex exclusive distributor for certain western
regions. On May 8, 1995, Hanchette brought
Baskin a proposed 24-month exclusive distribution
agreement which was prepared for signature.
When Hanchette left to return to North Carolina,
Baskin had three unresolved objections to the
distribution agreement. The minor objections
concerned Baskin's wish to increase the periods for
payment and for cure after notification of default
from 30 to 60 days. The major unresolved issue
was whether Baskin would be allowed to participate
when Apex directly sold to "national account"
customers. On May 9, 1995, Baskin made three
handwritten changes concerning these issues to the
proposed agreement, initialed each change, and
signed the agreement. On that day, Baskin mailed
the signed agreement to Apex, along with a cover
letter noting the modifications to the agreement and
requesting Hanchette to initial and date the changes.
Also on May 9, 1995, BDI placed an order for
products from Apex. Apex shipped this initial
stocking order in two installments on May 10 and
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May 18, 1995. BDI alleges that it had already
begun distributing Apex advertising materials and
receiving Apex product orders in May 1995, and
that when customers from its geographical area
called Apex regarding products they were referred
to BDI. BDI has yet to pay for the initial stocking
order.
On May 12, 1995, Pittway purchased all the assets
of Apex. The distribution agreement with BDI was
not listed as one of the specified liabilities Pittway
assumed pursuant to the purchase agreement. On
June 23, 1995, Pittway sent a letter to Baskin
informing him that Pittway had decided to sell its
Apex products directly to installing dealers
bypassing exclusive distributors. Pittway offered
to buy back any Apex products that BDI had not yet
sold.
BDI filed suit in July 1995, claiming breach of
contract and fraud. Apex counterclaimed against
BDI for BDI's failure to pay for the initial stocking
order shipped on May 9, 1995. BDI asserts that
Pittway's counterclaim should be set-off against
BDI's contractual damages claim. The district
court summarily dismissed BDI's breach of contract
claim and fraud charge, and denied BDI's motion
for reconsideration. The court, in its thorough
order, held that a reasonable jury could not find that
the parties ever formed an exclusive distribution
contract or that the actions of BDI and Apex
constituted confirmation of such an agreement
under the "merchant's confirmation" exception to
the statute of frauds. The court also held that
because no enforceable distribution contract was
formed, the May 9, 1995 order constituted a single
separate agreement, thus holding BDI liable for the
price of the goods ordered and received regardless
of the outcome of the breach of contract claim.
BDI appeals the dismissal of its breach of contract
claim and the grant of Apex's crossclaim summary
judgment motion.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

*2 This court reviews a grant of summary judgment
de novo.™1 The court must determine, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and whether
the district court correctly applied the relevant
substantive law.™2 We must not weigh the
evidence or determine the truth of the matters
asserted but must only determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.™3 The district court's
grant of summary judgment may be affirmed if it is
supported by any ground in the record, whether or
not the district court relied upon that ground.™4

FN1. Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc.,
Ill
F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir.1997)
(citations omitted); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc.
v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809
F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.1987).
FN2. Id.
FN3.M
FN4. Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d
848, 860 n. 17 (9th Cir. 1995).
B. Choice of Law
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.
") governs the alleged distribution agreement
between BDI and Apex because the agreement
primarily involves the sale of goods.™5
FN5. See Glacier Optical, Inc. v. Optique
Du Monde, Ltd., 816 F.Supp. 646, 653
(D.Or.1993), affd, 46 F.3d 1141 (9th
Cir. 1995) (finding under Washington law,
an alleged oral agreement to distribute
eyewear was governed by Wash.Rev.Code
Ann. § 62A.2-201); see also American
Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Bill Kummer, Inc.,
65 F.3d 1381, 1385-86 (7th Cir.1995)
(finding distributorship agreement as
predominantly contract for sale of goods);
Babst v. FMC Corp., 661 F.Supp. 82,
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(S.D.Miss.1986)
(same).
The
Uniform Commercial code as adopted in
Washington is found at Wash.Rev.Code
Ann. Title 62A.
BDI argues that the district court erred in applying
Washington law instead of North Carolina law
because the Apex distribution agreement provides
for the application of North Carolina law in regard
to "the legal relations between the parties." This
court will engage in a choice of law analysis only
when an actual conflict exists between Washington
law and the law of another state. ™6 Both
Washington and North Carolina have adopted
Section 2-201 of the U.C.C. dealing with the statute
of frauds.™7 We see no significant difference
between the Washington and North Carolina law
affecting this dispute.

FN6. Rice v. Dow Chem. Co., 124
Wash.2d 205, 875 P.2d 1213, 1216
(Wash.1994).
FN7.
N.C.Gen.Stat.
§
(1994-1996); Wash.Rev.Code
62A.2-201 (West 1997).

25-2-201
Ann. §

allows an action for breach of contract
notwithstanding the statute of frauds.™9 BDI
argues that, like the plaintiff in Klinke, it has
sufficient evidence to show that Apex promised to
execute the distribution agreement, and therefore,
BDI has an action based upon promissory estoppel
if Pittway breached its subsequent promise to
reduce the contract to an enforceable writing.™10

FN8. 94 Wash.2d 255, 616 P.2d 644
(Wash.l980)(enbanc).
FN9. 616 P.2d at 646-47.
FN 10. The purpose of promissory estoppel
is "to make a promise binding, under
certain
circumstances,
without
consideration in the usual sense of
something bargained for and given in
exchange. If the promisee's performance
was requested at the time the promisor
made his promise and that performance
was bargained for, the doctrine is
inapplicable." Id. at 648 n. 4 (quoting
Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
10 Cal.3d 665, 111 Cal.Rptr. 693, 517
P.2d 1157, 1161 (Cal. 1974)).

B. Promissory Estoppel
BDI argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
prohibits Pittway from asserting the statute of
frauds. BDI relies on Klinke v. Famous Recipe
Fried Chicken, Inc., in which the defendant induced
the plaintiff to leave his employ in Alaska and move
to Washington to establish a food franchise.™8
Although the defendant in Klinke promised the
plaintiff that the defendant would qualify and
register in Washington as a dealer in franchises, he
never did. The Washington Supreme Court
construed the Restatement of Contracts section 178
comment f, which states that a promise to make a
memorandum, if relied upon, "may give rise to an
effective promissory estoppel if the Statute (of
Frauds) would otherwise operate to defraud."
Applying this language, the Klinke court concluded
that on a motion for summary judgment, when facts
are asserted which show that a promise was made to
make and execute a written agreement, comment f

*3 The Washington Supreme court, however, in
Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil of California,
expressly distinguished the statute of frauds at issue
in Klinke from the statute of frauds contained within
the U.C.C..™ 11
FN11. Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co.
of Cal., 96 Wash.2d 291, 635 P.2d 103,
105(Wash.l981)(enbanc).
In interpreting and applying the statute of frauds
under California law, this court has held that
promissory estoppel cannot render an oral promise
otherwise within the statute of frauds enforceable.
™12 The Lige Dickson court adopted this view
holding that "promissory estoppel cannot be used to
overcome the statute of frauds in a case which
involves the sale of goods.™13 Although the court
recognized that the Restatement "authorizes
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enforcement of a promise which induced action or
forbearance by a promisee notwithstanding the
statute of frauds," it declined to apply this policy to
the sale of goods and circumvent the U.C.C..™14
The Washington Supreme Court noted that the
U.C.C. was designed in the hope that "commercial
transactions could take place across state
boundaries without the stultifying effect caused by
differences in states' laws." ¥Nl5 Thus, the court
decided to "join the other courts which limit the
doctrine of promissory estoppel from overcoming a
valid defense based on the statute of frauds
contained within the Uniform Commercial Code."
^ ^ North Carolina courts have limited denying a
defense of the statute of frauds to situations in
which a plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. "The North
Carolina courts have recognized to a limited extent
the doctrine of promissory estoppel, but have not
expressly recognized it in all situations.... The
North Carolina cases which have applied the
doctrine have only done so in a defensive situation,
where there has been an intended abandonment of
an existing right by the promisee. North Carolina
case law has not approved the doctrine for
affirmative relief." ^^

C Merchant's Exception Under the Statute of
Frauds
The Merchant's exception of the statute of frauds
provides that the statute will be satisfied between
merchants, "if within a reasonable time a writing in
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against
the sender is received and the party receiving it has
reason to know of its contents." FNU Under such
circumstances,
the
writing
"satisfies
the
requirements of [a writing] against such party unless
written notice of objection to its contents is given
within ten days after it is received." ¥Nl9 The
failure to answer a written confirmation of a
contract within ten days of receipt effectively takes
away from the party who fails to answer the defense
of the statute of frauds. If the defense fails because
of the merchant's exception, the proponent of the
oral contract still has the burden of proving that a
contract was made before the proponent issued the.
written confirmation.™20

FN18. Wash.Rev.Code. § 62A.2-201(2).
FN19.W.
FN20. U.C.C. §2-201 cmt. 3.

FN12. CR. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 856-57 (9th Cir.1977)

FN13. Lige Dickson, 635 P.2d at 107.
FN14.Matl05.
FN15.A/. atl07.
FN16.M
FN 17. Home Electric Co. of Lenoir, Inc. v.
Hall & Underdown Heating & Air
Conditioning Co., 86 N.C.App. 540, 358
S.E.2d 539, 541 (N.C.App. 1987), affd 322
N.C. 107, 366 S.E.2d441 (N.C.App. 1988).
We affirm the district court's holding against BDI's
promissory estoppel claim.

*4 BDI argues that the district court's determination
that no reasonable jury could conclude that a
contract had been formed or that the parties
understood there to have been a confirmation is
inconsistent with the record. The record indicates
that BDI sent Apex the standard Apex distribution
contract with the modifications signed by Baskin.
The record does not show that Apex objected to
these modifications within the proscribed ten day
period. Apex subsequently shipped Apex products
to BDI, referred its dealers to BDI, and gave BDI
technical support and otherwise performed as
required under the contract. BDI asserts that the
modified agreement and cover letter are
confirmatory writings and that the initial stocking
order constitutes a confirmation of the distribution
agreement. BDI contends that this evidence
illustrates that Apex agreed to perform under the
terms of the modified contract and that a jury
should be allowed to weigh the evidence to
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determine whether or not Apex indeed acted
consistent with the agreement.
While "questions about whether a party received the
writing, whether it was received within a reasonable
time, whether the receiver had reason to know its
contents, sent objections, or the like, are questions
of fact," whether a writing in confirmation of an
oral contract satisfies the statute of frauds is an
issue of law for the court.™21

FN21.
GPL
Treatment,
Ltd.
v.
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 323 Or. 116, 914
P.2d 682, 686 (Or. 1996) {citing Ronald A.
Anderson, 2 Uniform Commercial Code, §
2-201:146 (3d ed. 1982 & Supp.1995)).
Relying on Howard Construction Co. v. Jeff-Cole
Quarries, Inc.™22 the district court determined
that a confirmatory writing must be sufficient in and
of itself to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made. In Howard Construction, the court
suggested that in order for a writing to indicate that
the parties had reached an agreement and not simply
negotiations, the writing should include the terms "
in confirmation of," "as per our agreement," or "as
sold to buyer." FN23 Many other courts, however,
have not required that the confirmatory writing
expressly refer to the oral contract which it confirms
or include specific contents, but only that the
writing afford a basis for believing the offered oral
evidence rests on a real transaction.™24

FN22. 669 S.W.2d221 (Mo.Ct.App.1984).
FN23. M a t 227-28.
FN24. See, e.g., Hilord Chem. Corp. v.
Ricoh Elec, Inc., 875 F.2d 32 (2d
Cir.1989) (holding no rigid requirement as
to form or content of confirmatory
writing); Rockland Indus., Inc. v. Frank
Kasmir Assocs., 470 F.Supp. 1176
(N.D.Tex. 1979) (writing need only be
consistent with sale predicated upon prior
transaction).

Under Washington law, when "there are more than
one written document that relate to the same subject
matter, [which] are not inconsistent with each other
and appear to be executed as part of the same
transaction, they may be considered together to
determine the parties' intent." FN25 The parol
evidence rule does not apply when the parties are
seeking to establish the validity or invalidity of a
contract.FN26
The parol evidence rule
"
presupposes an action based on a valid contract;
and if the issue is as to the existence or validity of
the alleged contract, the rule, by its very terms, has
no application." FN27

FN25. Spokane Helicopter Ser., Inc. v.
Malone, 28 Wash.App. 377, 623 P.2d 727,
730 (Wash.App. 1981).
FN26. Bond v. Wiegardt, 36 Wash.2d 41,
216 P.2d 196, 200 (Wash.1950); In re
Prior Bros., Inc. Int'l Harvester Co. v.
Bank of Cal, N.A., 29 Wash.App. 905,
632 P.2d 522 (Wash.App. 1981).
FN27. Bond, 216 P.2d at 200.
*5 The district court properly examined both the
cover letter, BDI's and Apex's actions and the
distribution agreement to determine that BDI did
not satisfy the merchant's exception to the statute of
frauds. Baskin's cover letter to Apex states that he
modified the distribution agreement in certain
respects and requested that Hanchette approve the
modifications made by initialing and dating the
contract. Hanchette never did. In addition, the
court found important the language in the cover
letter from Baskin to Hanchette in which Baskin
wrote, "[w]e are excited as ever at Baskin
Distribution to begin our relationship with Apex
and hope that these changes do not prevent a
mutually beneficial relationship from beginning."
The district court concluded that this language,
along with Baskin's alteration of the distribution
agreement, indicate that the contract was in the
negotiation process, and thus not yet formed. The
proponent of an oral contract always maintains the
burden of proving that a contract was made before
the proponent issued the written confirmation.FN28
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The writing cannot be a confirmation of a
nonexistent contract. The merchant's exception
does not apply.

C.A.9 (Wash.),1998.
Baskin Distribution, Inc. v. Pittway Corp.
141 F.3d 1173, 1998 WL 101691 (C.A.9 (Wash.))
END OF DOCUMENT

FN28. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 3.
C Set-Off
The district court granted Pittway's motion for
summary judgment on a counterclaim against BDI
arising out of BDI's decision not to pay for the
initial stocking order of May 9, 1995. The court
found that the stocking order was wholly separate
from the distribution agreement and that BDI is
liable for $58,964.62 plus interest (the price of the
goods ordered and received).
BDI has refused to pay for this initial order because
it believes the goods price should serve as a set-off
for the alleged breach of contract. BDI asserts that
the initial stocking order was wholly related to the
distribution agreement as BDI would have no
interest in a single inventory order without the
24-month exclusive distribution agreement. BDI
argues that it is unjust to compel BDI to pay for an
order it placed in reliance on an agreement which
Apex now disavows.
Under the U.C.C, an individual may have an
obligation to pay for goods tendered and accepted
notwithstanding allegations that a distribution
agreement has been breached.™29 In this case,
the district court found that the order placed for the
goods BDI received was separate from any alleged
distribution agreement entered into between the
parties. Accordingly, the district court correctly
held BDI liable for the costs of the goods received.
FN29. United Beer Distrib. Co. v. Hiram
Walker (N.Y.), Inc., 163 A.D.2d 79, 81,
557 N.Y.S.2d 336 (N.Y.App.Div.1990) ("
The only sale documents herein [a series of
purchasing orders] concern individual
shipments of beer and have nothing to do
with the asserted distribution agreement.")
AFFIRMED.
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United States District Court,W.D. Texas, El Paso
Division.
Frank SEGALINE and Anita Segaline, Plaintiffs,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant
No. EP-02-CA-185-DB.
April 18,2003.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BRIONES, J.
* 1 0 n this day, the Court considered a "Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in Support of
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" (the "
Summary Judgment Motion"), filed by Plaintiffs
Frank Segaline and Anita Segaline in the
above-captioned cause on January 30, 2003. On
February 14, 2003, Defendant Bank of America, N
.A. filed a "Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's
Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment" (the "
Counter-Motion"). After due consideration, the
Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs Summary
Judgment Motion should be denied and that
Defendant's Counter-Motion should be granted.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Defendant's refusal to make a
home equity loan to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs initially
filed this case in state court, bringing one cause of
action for breach of contract and a second cause of
action for violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f.
Defendant removed the case to this Court based on
federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiffs subsequently
amended their Complaint twice, with Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint being the operative

pleading. The Second Amended Complaint alleges
essentially the same two causes of action.
Defendant filed an Answer to the Second Amended
Complaint on January 3, 2003. The instant
Summary Judgment Motion and Counter-Motion
followed.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted only where "
the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party that moves
for summary judgment bears an initial burden of
identifying those portions of the pleadings and
discovery on file, together with any affidavit, which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553,
91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "If the moving party fails to
meet this burden, the motion must be denied,
regardless of the nonmovant's response." Tubacex,
Inc. v. M/VRisan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir.1995).
If the movant does meet this burden, however, the
nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and
designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. "If the non-movant fails
to meet this burden, then summary judgment is
appropriate." Tubacex, 45 F.3d at 954.
When making a determination under Rule 56,
factual questions and inferences are viewed in a
light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Lemelle
v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th
Cir.1994). The party opposing a motion supported
by evidence cannot discharge his burden by alleging
mere legal conclusions. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, All U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Instead, the party
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must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat
a properly supported motion for summary
judgment. See id.
DISCUSSION
A. Facts
*2 The material facts in this case are not in dispute.
In January 2002, Plaintiffs, formerly husband and
wife, applied for a home equity loan from
Defendant, offering as collateral a home in El Paso
that they contend is their homestead. On June 30,
2000, a year and a half before they applied for the
loan, Plaintiffs were divorced in El Paso, Texas.
Pursuant to the divorce decree, they continue to
jointly own the home until it is sold. Frank Segaline
pursued the loan while Anita Segaline was in
Connecticut tending to her mother who was ill.
Throughout the loan application process, Frank
Segaline referred to Anita Segaline as his "wife." In
her affidavit, Lisa Rosales, Defendant's loan officer
who processed the application for Frank Segaline,
attests that he continuously referred to Anita
Segaline as his wife, leading Rosales to believe that
Plaintiffs were still legally married. Plaintiffs do not
itfiite Rosales's statements, nor does Frank Segaline
deny having referred to Anita Segaline as his wife.

.)

application, Defendant forwarded copies of the loan
documents to Anita Segaline in Connecticut for
signature. The document entitled "Texas Home
Equity Security Instrument" was intended to create
a security interest in the home that would be subject
to the protections provided for in Section 50(a)(6)
of Article XVI of the Texas Constitution, discussed
below. The first page of that document indicates
that the instrument was to be made by "FRANK
SEGALINE AND ANITA SEGALINE, MARRIED
TO EACH OTHER." The last page provided a
space for each Plaintiff to sign as grantors. The line
provided for Anita Segaline's signature also
included the phrase "MARRIED TO EACH
OTHER." In both places, Anita Segaline lined out
the phrase "MARRIED TO EACH OTHER" and
wrote "Divorced 6/30/00." Both Plaintiffs signed
the last page of the document, along with other
documents related to the loan. Upon receipt of the
altered document, Defendant became concerned
that the home that was to be collateral for the loan
may not be Anita Segaline's homestead. A closer
look at Anita Segaline's credit report also revealed
her address to be in Connecticut which cast further
concern over her homestead claim. When asked,
Frank Segaline refused to provide any information
concerning the issue. Defendant then withdrew its
loan offer. Plaintiffs obtained alternate financing at
a higher rate and filed this cause to recover the
difference.

FNl

FN1. In fact, in the second paragraph of
his affidavit attached to Plaintiffs'
Summary Judgment Motion, Frank
Segaline states that he is the "former
husband of Anita Segaline," then goes on
to say: "My wife and I are still the owners
of the home...." (Emphasis added.) The
Court notes that the parol evidence rule
does not prevent the consideration of such
evidence when the existence of the
contract is at issue, as discussed below.
Muhm v. Davis, 580 S.W.2d 98, 101
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ
ref d n.r.e.).
Once

Defendant

approved

Plaintiffs'

loan
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B. Defendant is Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of
Law
In their Summary Judgment Motion, Plaintiffs ask
the Court to grant judgment in their favor only on
their breach of contract claim and do not address
their ECOA claim. In its Counter-Motion,
Defendant asks the Court for judgment on both. The
Court will address each claim in turn.
/. Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract Claim
Plaintiffs contend that they had entered into a
contract with Defendant for a home equity loan at a
specified rate and that Defendant breached the
contract when it withdrew approval of the loan.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Defendant argues that no contract was formed
because Anita Segaline altered a material term of
the offer when she replaced the phrase "MARRIED
TO EACH OTHER" with "Divorced 6/30/00."
Defendant contends that Anita Segaline's
amendment constituted a counteroffer which
Defendant chose not to accept. The Court agrees
with Defendant.
*3 To prevail on their breach of contract claim,
Plaintiffs must show the existence of a valid
contract, that they performed or tendered
performance, that Defendant breached the contract,
and that their damages resulted from that breach.
Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v.. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d
741, 758 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). For
there to be a binding contract, there must be "(1) an
offer; (2) acceptance in strict compliance with the
terms of the offer; (3) a meeting of the minds; (4) a
communication that each party has consented to the
terms of the agreement; and (5) execution and
delivery of the contract with an intent that it become
mutual and binding on both parties." Hallmark v.
Hand, 885 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tex.App.-El Paso
1994, writ denied). Plaintiffs have not met their
burden to show that a valid contract existed.
Specifically, Plaintiffs skip over the five elements
listed above and jump directly to their argument
that the contract was breached. Before there can be
a breach, however, there must be a contract.
Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs'
Summary Judgment Motion should be denied.
In its Counter-Motion, Defendant challenges the
existence of the contract, arguing that Plaintiffs
never accepted Defendant's offer because they
changed a material term. Defendant offered the
home equity loan to Plaintiffs with the
understanding that they were legally married and
that the home was their homestead. Article 16, §
50(a) and (a)(6) of the Texas Constitution provides
protection for a family or single person's homestead
from forced sale for the payment of debts except
under certain circumstances, including where the
debt is secured by a voluntary lien on the
homestead, as in the loan requested by Plaintiffs.
TEX. CONST, art. XVI, § 50(a), (a)(6). Because of
this protection, Defendant would enjoy enforceable
security in the collateral whereas another creditor
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

would not be able to obtain a lien on the home in
satisfaction of an unrelated debt. If the home was
not the homestead of either Frank or Anita Segaline,
Article 16 would not apply. Each of the documents
signed by Plaintiffs and offered as summary
judgment evidence refers to Article 16, thus
homestead protection under the Texas Constitution
was undoubtedly a material term of the loan offer.
Based on Frank Segaline's choice of words,
Defendant's officers believed that Anita Segaline
was still his wife. Anita Segaline's revelation to the
contrary cast doubt on the characterization of the
home as Plaintiffs' homestead. Although Plaintiffs
need not be married for their homestead to be
protected by Article 16, it is their burden to
establish the homestead character of the property.
Sanchez v. Telles, 960 S.W.2d 762, 770
(Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, pet. denied) (citations
omitted). To do so, "the claimant must show a
combination of both overt acts of homestead usage
and the intention on the part of the owner to claim
the land as a homestead." Id.
*4 In this case, Frank Segaline misrepresented the
Plaintiffs' marital status during the loan application
process. When Defendant learned Plaintiffs' true
status, it created significant doubt as to a material
term of the contract-that the collateral was the
homestead of the borrowers. Because this change
occurred, there was no acceptance by Plaintiffs of
Defendant's offer. Without acceptance, there is no
contract, and in the absence of a contract, there can
be no breach. Therefore, the Court is of the opinion
that Defendant's Counter-Motion should be granted
as to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim.
II. Plaintiffs' Equal Credit Opportunity Act Claim
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs also
allege that Defendant denied the loan because of
their marital status, in violation of the ECOA. In the
Counter-Motion, Defendant argues that its concern
with Plaintiffs' marital status was in relation to the
characterization of the collateral as Plaintiffs'
homestead, and therefore related to Defendant's
rights and remedies as creditor. The Court agrees
with Defendant.
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Title 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) prohibits a creditor
from discriminating against an applicant based on
marital status. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a)(1) (West
1998). Section 1691(b)(1), however, specifies that
an inquiry into the marital status of a credit
applicant to determine the creditor's rights and
remedies does not constitute discrimination under
the ECOA. Id § 1691(b)(1). This case could not be
more clear. Defendant denied the loan because it
was a home equity loan offered under the provisions
of the Texas Constitution and Defendant had no
assurance that the collateral was Plaintiffs'
homestead. Plaintiffs' marital status only became an
issue in so much as it affected whether or not the
collateral was in fact the homestead for both
Plaintiffs. Such an inquiry goes to the heart of
Defendant's rights and remedies as the creditor on
such a loan. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to
refute
Defendant's
properly
supported
Counter-Motion on this point. Therefore, the Court
is of the opinion that Defendant's Counter-Motion
should be granted as to Plaintiffs' ECOA claim.

W.D.Tex.,2003.
Segaline v. Bank of America, N.A.
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 21135553
(W.D.Tex.)
END OF DOCUMENT

CONCLUSION
After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion
that Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motion should
be denied. The Court is further of the opinion that
Defendant's Counter-Motion should be granted as to
both of Plaintiffs' claims.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Plaintiffs Frank Segaline's and Anita Segaline's "
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment"
is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Bank
of America, N.A.'s "Counter-Motion for Summary
Judgment" is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the
above-captioned cause is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that all other pending
motions, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT.
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